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ABSTRACT: Like most domains of science, the study of the mind has been tackled at many 
scales of analysis, from the behavior of large groups of people (economics and ecology), to the 
diffusion of ions across cellular membranes (molecular biology and biophysics).  At each of 
these scales, researchers often believe that the critical phenomena of interest, and the most 
powerful explanatory constructs and mechanisms, reside at their scale of analysis, with finer 
scales argued to be incapable of predicting the interesting phenomena, while coarser scales are 
purported to miss critical mechanistic subtleties.  Here we argue by analogy that, for better or 
worse, researchers at all scales are correct: phenomena at each scale of analysis are intractable 
from other scales; thus, while reductionism is a useful scientific goal, it will not obviate the need 
for macroscopic research, constructs, and formalisms. 
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ALL MODELS ARE WRONG, BUT SOME ARE USEFUL – George Box 
At what scale should we study human behavior and the brain processes responsible?    
Fields at adjacent scales of analysis find themselves in similar disagreements, with 
every field condemning more abstract scales of analysis for failing to describe “how” 
various processes work, and more minute scales for missing the forest for the trees. 
Conveniently, the purportedly appropriate scale of analysis for studying “mechanisms” 
of mind and behavior usually coincides with that of the speakers’ own research 
program. 
Computational cognitive scientists argue that understanding the brain requires a 
more abstract description of the organisms goals and available information, and claim 
cognitive psychologists face an insurmountably under constrained task in trying to 
describe the function of the whole organism by cobbling together isolated algorithms. 
Cognitive psychologists in turn condemn computational cognitive scientists for 
working with idealized learning models and glossing over specific errors and deviations 
from these idealizations found while studying particular psychological mechanisms. 
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Cognitive psychologists assert that constraining processes and algorithms from 
neurological systems discovered through imaging data would be impossibly complex, 
while cognitive neuroscientists point out that the constructs that cognitive psychologists 
study cannot identify the neural mechanisms that necessarily underlie those processes. 
Cognitive neuroscientists themselves argue that characterizing the aggregate 
function of a brain area from the behavior of individual cells is hopelessly difficult, 
while electrophysiologists contend that cognitive neuroscientists merely show which 
areas are active, and cannot characterize the circuitry and mechanisms within those 
areas. 
Electrophysiologists in turn believe that studying the function of a cell based on its 
connections with its neighbors would be problematic to accomplish, while 
connectomicists argue that the connections among neurons are the mechanisms of 
brain function. 
Connectomicists assert that studying neural connections in terms of the molecular 
processes of synaptic formation is irreducibly complex, while cellular and molecular 
neuroscientists contend that understanding  these connections requires studying the 
formation  and maintenance of synapses at the molecular level. 
There is a common thread throughout all of the across-level disputes: the higher 
scale of analysis (greater abstraction) maintains that extracting their phenomena of 
interest from lower scales of analysis is impractical and hopeless, while the lower scales 
(less abstraction) insist that the constructs used as explanatory mechanisms at the 
higher scales simply do not exist when scrutinized, and conceal much more 
complicated and varied, smaller scale phenomena. 
Who is right? Here we contend that both sides of these many arguments are 
correct, and that reductionism, while a useful scientific goal, will not eliminate the 
need for the more abstract scales of analysis. 
HOW? 
What does it mean to answer a “how” question? How do people learn? How do we 
speak?  How do we emote? Locomote? See? Researchers in many subfields of 
behavioral, cognitive, and neural sciences, all purport to be studying the 
“mechanisms” of behavior that answer these how questions. Unfortunately, one 
scientist’s mechanism, is merely a phenomenon in need of a mechanism to another. Thus, 
while one researcher may consider their explanations to be satisfying answers to how 
questions, to others that explanation itself needs to be explained to answer “how”. 
Not only do the basic units and phenomena differ across scales, but these scales are 
also conducive to different formalisms: when describing the behavior of groups of 
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individuals, microeconomics offers elegant equations for the interactions of supply, 
demand, and price, but cannot describe how a single individual will  react to economic  
changes. When studying the behavior of individuals, formalisms at Marr’s 
computational level (e.g., Bayesian statistics) can specify our goals, available 
information,  and prior knowledge we use make inferences and choose actions,  but 
then we are agnostic  to the process the mind uses to carry out this information 
processing. When studying the microstructure of behavior, such as variations in 
response times, constraints on memory, and processing speed, we must describe 
human cognition at the algorithmic level using the language of computer science, 
describing how people represent data, and what procedures operate over these 
representations to make the required computations.  If we focus on the scale of 
neuronal ensembles, we would instead adopt the language of electrical engineering, 
and talk about the neural signals, systems, and circuits that are the physiological 
instantiations of the algorithmic description.  We could reduce further to the level of 
biochemistry, where we describe the individual neurotransmitters, ion channels, and 
chemical gradients that allow neurons to pass information between one another and 
generate action potentials.  Of course, we needn’t stop there, since those individual 
neurotransmitter molecules and ions are comprised of atoms and subatomic particles. 
So, how do we decide at which scale of analysis, or level of abstraction to operate?  
Before offering an answer, let’s consider an engineered system, where we (well, maybe 
not us specifically – but someone) can characterize the system at all relevant scales. 
SCALES OF A SMARTPHONE 
“How” does my smartphone correct my typos? As in the case for the how questions 
about human behavior, we can answer this at many scales of analysis, and the 
appropriate scale depends crucially on the question we are asking. 
What will my typo be replaced with? At the information scale of analysis, the phone has 
access to a dictionary of acceptable words, and has some distance metric between two 
strings (a distance metric based on likely data entry errors made on a qwerty 
keyboard).  Based on this distance metric, the phone can identify which dictionary 
words are closest to the entered string, and thus suggest replacements (perhaps 
weighting the distance metric by the probability of a given word within the context of 
other words). The dictionary and distance metric determine which words will be the 
top suggestions for a given string. 
How fast will it make the correction?  At the algorithmic scale of analysis, the phone has 
particular search algorithms that it uses to pick out candidate subsets of words from 
the dictionary, and to compute the distance between a string and those candidate 
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words. These algorithms (instantiated in machine code) determine how much memory 
and relative CPU time it will take to produce candidate corrections for various strings. 
What happens if the phone breaks? At the scale of circuitry, we may specify the locations 
and arrangement of micro transistors in the phone, its flash memory store, and where 
on that array the dictionary is stored, the architecture of the CPU, and how it is 
connected to the display, etc. At this level of description, we might be able to indicate 
what parts of the spell-correction process would break if we were to snip some circuitry 
within the phone. 
How much energy does this process use? At the scale of materials, we might specify the 
conductive properties of the circuitry connecting memory stores and comprising the 
CPU architecture,  as well as the chemical  properties of the battery providing the 
energy required for the system to operate at all. At this scale of analysis, we might be 
able to predict why spell-checking drains more battery power when the weather is 
cold, or why the phone gets warm when we ask it to do lots of spell-checking at once. 
Each of these questions is best suited to a different level of analysis. It would be 
wildly impractical to reason out the abstract distance metric and contents of the 
dictionary from machine code, and determining it from bare circuitry, while 
theoretically possible, would be hopeless in practice. Conversely, an understanding the 
distance metric and algorithm simply offers no language to express material or circuit 
properties that could describe phenomena at that scale. 
In short, each scale of analysis, or level of abstraction, is useful – the more abstract 
scales allow us to predict higher order phenomena without simulating intractably 
complicated systems; the less abstract levels of description allow us to capture 
phenomena that may be inexpressible at greater abstractions. We believe that 
restricting the study of the brain to a single “correct” level of analysis would be akin to 
restricting a smartphone designer to hiring only materials scientists or electrical 
engineers or software developers – each provides solutions to different sets of 
problems, and a smartphone could not be fully understood, much less developed, 
without input at all levels of analysis. 
SCALES OF A MEMORY SYSTEM 
“How” do we remember things? Unlike the smartphone example, we do not know 
how the brain works, so we do not have a roadmap that segments levels of analysis and 
defines how they connect. Nonetheless, different questions lend themselves more 
readily to different levels of analysis, as demonstrated by successes in memory 
research: 
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What will we recall if cued with a particular item? Just like studying  a spell-check  
process, this question requires us to know the contents of memory (the ‘dictionary’) 
and the process by which items are queried. Researchers have been investigating  how 
the query process works, including how combinations of cues and context  might 
influence recall (Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 2009) or how we search through our 
stored memories to find close associations to a cue (Abbott, Austerweil, & Griffiths, 
2012). These theories are intentionally agnostic to the biological bases of memory: 
knowing where in the brain memories are stored or the biochemical reactions that lead 
to neural changes will not describe the retrieval process adequately. 
How should we provide information in a classroom to increase learning?  If we want to apply 
psychological research to education, then we must focus on the process by which new 
information is stored in memory and old information is forgotten. Here researchers 
investigate the optimal timing and method of presenting and testing material in order 
to ensure students learn and retain information (Roher & Pashler, 2010). Knowing 
how the mind stores and queries information can constrain these processes, but even a 
perfect knowledge of this cannot predict the time profile of adding information to these 
stores. Similarly, this learning is achieved through a complex process that takes 
perceptual information, processes it, and stores it; knowing the biological bases of this 
process would knowing the biological bases of this process would in theory allow us to 
replicate this time course, but would require significantly more computation to provide 
us with the same answer. 
What brain areas should be spared during surgery to avoid memory deficits? If we want to 
know where in the brain memories are processed and stored, our cognitive theories of 
the storage and retrieval of memory are uninformative – instead we must study the 
biological bases and memory circuits involved in this processing.  For instance, we may 
rely on decades of research from patient studies (Scoville & Milner, 1957) and brain 
activity patterns (Smith, Wixted, & Squire, 2011) that have suggested that the 
hippocampus is required for forming new memories. 
What drugs might promote better memory? At this level, even knowing the brain areas 
and circuits underlying memory will provide little help.  Instead, we need to 
understand the biochemical bases beneath these brain regions: what pharmacological 
agents, introduced at what time, might increase long-term potentiation (Stella, 
Schweitzer, & Piomelli, 1997), inhibit synaptic degradation (Pak & Sheng, 2003), and 
otherwise modulate the synaptic changes that underlie learning and memory (Davis & 
Squire, 1984)? 
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TRADEOFFS IN SCALES OF ANALYSIS, AND REDUCTIONISM 
Even if we consider physics—a model of reductionist success—we find that although 
we can reduce macroscopic constructs to their microscopic mechanisms, all the way 
down to subatomic particles, we do not throw out the formalisms at the more abstract 
levels. When dealing with a higher order abstraction (like classical mechanics), we will 
fail to account for some subtleties that would be captured at a finer scale (quantum 
interactions), which could end up playing an important role in the phenomenon of 
interest. When dealing with lower abstractions (such as particle physics), we face a vast 
computational challenge when trying to describe higher-order phenomena (like how a 
ball will bounce). Thus, physical models at different levels of abstraction have proved 
to be more or less useful depending on the phenomenon of interest, so different 
abstractions are emphasized in astrophysics, mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering, and quantum computing. Climate and meteorology models do not 
attempt to predict weather from individual quantum particles, because it would be a 
futile computational endeavor; they do not even consider the behavior of individual 
particles, or the statistical mechanics of groups of particles – instead they adopt 
volumetric analyses of the temperature and pressure of kilometer, or hundreds-of-
kilometers scale regions of the atmosphere. 
Yet despite the large numbers of scales and models used in modern physics, 
reductionism has been a necessary part of the research enterprise – higher level models 
can place constraints on lower levels, and lower level models can provide additional 
insight into higher level. Quantum mechanics, for instance, would have never been 
accepted as a theory had it not scaled up to classical mechanics on a macroscopic level. 
Conversely, findings from quantum mechanics have led us to understand 
superconductivity, which has lent itself to many novel uses in electrical engineering. 
Reductionism must hold a similar place in the study of the brain.  We are 
reassured of our scientific models at higher levels of abstraction (like trichromacy – the 
theory that human color vision is three dimensional) when those models may be 
derived from properties at lower orders of abstraction (the existence of three cone 
types). Similarly, we are reassured that we are measuring relevant properties of 
complexly interacting elements (like receptive field size of V1 cells) when those 
properties can be simplified to abstractions about the important behaviors of the 
system as a whole (cortical magnification and the falloff of acuity with eccentricity).  
Thus, connecting two scales of analysis validates models at both levels of abstraction,  
so there is a scientific  demand for a single unified model of human behavior, 
cognition, and neuroscience by reducing cognitive theories to their biological 
underpinnings. However, even when the levels of abstraction are united, such that 
theoretical constructs at higher levels of abstractions may be reduced to their 
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mechanisms at finer scales throughout the full hierarchy of analysis, we should not 
expect that one level of description will emerge as the most fundamental, useful, or 
practical. 
CLOSING 
When studying human behavior, we face a salient problem: we really have very little 
idea of how it all works, at any scale. The models and theories we work with at various 
scales of analysis are our best current approximations – subject to infinite revision and 
refinement, happening weekly. So, at this point it may not be obvious what a final 
understanding of human behavior will look like.  Self-interested researchers often 
anticipate that the final, fundamental description of the “mechanisms” of behavior will 
be cast at their level of analysis. However, if we are to take any lessons from physics 
and engineering, we should note that is not what happens in these fields that have 
succeeded in characterizing their domains of interest – these disciplines yield multiple 
characterizations at multiple scales of analysis, with the abstract constructs at higher 
levels of description reducing to the interaction of less abstract constructs at lower 
levels of description.  Moreover, even once such a chain of reductionism has been 
completed throughout all scales, we do not see that one level of abstraction dominates 
in its utility, or practical application: we aim to predict and manipulate phenomena at 
many different scales, and to do so, we must use an appropriate level of abstraction for 
each. Using too microscopic a scale of analysis yields intractable computational 
problems, and using too macroscopic a scale of analysis misses critical details of the 
phenomena of interest.  We should expect the same reliance on all scales of analysis 
when we have figured out how to predict and manipulate human behavior. 
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